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In today’s society, it is not only the case that people are controlled by others (i.e. that 
their moves are recorded by video cameras and data related to their lives are collected 
at every point in their lives); increasingly, people are monitoring themselves and are 
knowingly or unknowingly allowing various enterprises to collect their data. 
Although people often “sign” informed consent agreements when they use self-
monitoring apps or when they engage with the Internet of things and control their 
environment from afar, they often ignore the fact that they are allowing corporations 
and state surveillance apparatuses to use their data in ways that go against their 
interests. With the vast new knowledge that we are dealing with in these times of big 
data, there is a concurrent increase in the ignorance pertaining thereto. 
 
This chapter will first analyse the psychological mechanisms that are behind our 
passion for self-monitoring. Second, it will look at the way corporations exploit these 
passions. And third, it will address the question of why people so easily ignore the 
fact that data about their lives is collected which can often be used to their 
disadvantage. 
 
Self-surveillance in the era of big data 
 
The market is flooded with devices that are supposed to help us navigate our daily 
lives so that we will become more productive, better organised, fitter, healthier, 
slimmer, and even less stressed. The expectation is that these devices will help the 
individual alter his or her life in such a way that it comes closer to the ideals of 
success and self-fulfilment. Many of the applications that we install on our smart 
phones rely on the idea that we will achieve these goals with the help of 
measurements. We can thus measure our calories, walking, running, heartbeat, 
menstrual cycle, and – during pregnancy – even the heartbeat of our unborn child.  
 
If we think about previous generations, we cannot say that there was a culture of 
counting how many steps a person walked per day, how many calories he or she 
consumed, how many hours per day one was asleep, or how often one meditated per 
week. Sociologists researching the way post-industrial capitalism insists on an 
increase in productivity link the obsession with measurement to new forms of social 
control. The subject is constantly under pressure to produce more, to be quicker, and 
is especially anxious about his or her employment. Keeping track of one’s 
productivity at the workplace has, however, in recent decades expanded into keeping 
track of one’s private life. The ideas of achievement, success, and happiness that have 
been part of the dominant ideology in post-industrial capitalism have opened up the 
doors to the wellness industry (Cederström and Spicer, 2015) and self-help 
enterprises, which have become the prime promoters of the idea that with the help of 
proper measurement, tracking, and self-control, the subject will be able to come closer 
to attaining these ideals.  
 
The first problem with plans for self-improvement is that most of the time people do 
not follow them for a long time; the second is that these plans often increase a 
person’s anxiety and feelings of guilt; and the third is that the new technologies that 
we now use to monitor our progress allow for the collection of data about us that can 
be used and abused in ways we cannot easily imagine.  
 
Embarking on a quest to change one’s habits might mean constantly failing to follow 
a particular plan. Personal measurement and tracking appear to be strategies that can 
make the process of self-transformation more manageable and predictable. The 
numbers that we record on our devices are also supposed to help us not succumb to 
temptation. They seem to be contemporary self-binding mechanisms.  
 
Looking far back into the past, Homer was aware of the necessity of self-binding, 
which is why his Odysseus ties himself to the mast in order to not succumb to Siren’s 
song. John Elster (Elster, 2016) links self-binding to various strategies whereby 
people try to pursue their quest to change a particular behaviour. If we, for example, 
want to stop smoking, we might tell everyone around us of our intention and by doing 
so we might be less inclined to light a cigarette in their presence. Such strategies of 
self-binding rely on the feelings of guilt and embarrassment that people experience in 
the presence of other people.  
 
Paradoxically, the Internet allows for the creation of self-binding strategies that also 
rely on these feelings, even though people do not necessarily have face-to-face 
contact with people online. People who try to lose weight and log their food intake 
into an online forum daily might experience feelings of guilt when they do not follow 
their diet plan and, for example, admit their food indulgences to anonymous strangers 
online.  
 
One cannot deny that feelings of guilt can be a powerful motivator when people try to 
change their habits. If online communication with anonymous interlocutors can 
contribute to these feelings, the question remains whether that happens also when 
people try to change their lives with the help of various monitoring devices.  
 
The failure of self-monitoring 
 
Although people fervently download apps that are supposed to monitor their progress, 
the majority soon forget about them and for one reason or another stop measuring 
their progress. Researchers who study motivation and attempt to ascertain why apps 
are so easily forgotten rediscovered Aristotle’s term “akrasia” which in antiquity 
described how a person acts against his or her better judgement. Today this term is 
supposed to depict a form of procrastination when people do not follow through with 
their plans. (Clear, 2016) 
 
A number of interesting studies about the failure to follow our plans with the help of 
tracking devices have been carried out in the field of medicine. One study looked at 
the link between physical activity and monetary compensation. People who were 
asked to monitor their physical activity and got paid for increasing the total number of 
steps they walked per day usually abandoned their fitness goals when they stopped 
receiving money for their efforts. (Finkelstein et al., 2016) During the study, when the 
subjects were financially compensated for being more physically active, it looked like 
they were easily able to change their lifestyle and improve their health. Although the 
expectation was that their increased wellbeing would help them continue with the 
plan when money ceased to be the motivating factor, for the majority of participants 
this was not the case. When the financial benefit ended, most of the participants 
became less physically active.  
 
While it might be debatable whether money should be used as an incentive to change 
one’s habits (Sandel, 2013), for our argument here it is interesting to look at the 
failure of self-monitoring through the lens of psychology and psychoanalysis. In the 
last two decades, psychological studies on willpower have relied heavily on a study 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice, 1998) that tested the willpower of 
people by means of two different exercises. Baumeister and his colleagues first 
examined people’s willpower by instructing two groups of people on what to eat. 
Both groups had chocolate cookies and a bowl of radishes presented in front of them. 
One group was asked to eat only radishes, while the other was allowed to eat cookies. 
The idea was to measure how much self-discipline it would take for the radish-eating 
group to resist the cookies. After this experiment, both groups were asked to solve 
puzzles that, however, were unsolvable. The surprising result was that the group that 
was allowed to eat cookies spent much longer on trying to solve these puzzles, while 
the radish eaters gave up more quickly. The explanation for this behaviour was that 
willpower is like a muscle that can be strengthened with regular exercise, but using it 
too much can deplete its strength. If we use willpower for one task we might not be as 
effective in using it for another. The radish eaters used up their willpower and that 
prevented them from being more persistent with regard to solving the puzzle, while 
the cookie eaters, who did not need to use their willpower in the first experiment, 
were able to use their willpower in the second experiment. 
 
In the last few years, the failure to replicate Baumeister’s experiment (Hagger et al., 
2016) has led psychologists to conclude that “willpower isn’t a limited resource, but 
believing that it is makes you less likely to follow through on your plans.”(Burkeman, 
2017) If we presuppose that trying to restrain ourselves with regard to one temptation 
will exhaust our willpower and as a result we will be less likely to follow through 
with another project, it will actually happen that we will use less willpower in the 
second case. However, if we do not presuppose that there is something like 
“willpower fatigue”, that will not happen.  
 
Other studies in the domain of willpower have tried to tie the ability to follow self-
formulated plans to change one’s behaviour with emotions. Some self-help books thus 
advise people to observe which emotions they experience when they try to follow 
particular plans to change and advise people on how not to use up all their energy to 
deal with these emotions but rather engage in altering their environment so that it 
helps them pursue their goals. (McGonigal, 2013)  
 
And here we come to apps and wearable technology, which is supposed to be 
something that manipulates the environment in such a way that it is easier for people 
to follow through with plans for personal change. Since people might download many 
apps and buy wearable devices, but can easily “forget” to track whatever they planned 
to track and thus do not achieve their goals, more and more of these devices attempt 
to increase feelings of guilt and anxiety. The idea is that people will be more inclined 
to follow through with their plans if they are anxious that they will be punished for 
their failures.  
 
Apps and self-punishment 
 
A wristband device called Pavlok offers people a way to impose self-punishment 
when they do not follow through with their plans. A Pavlok wearer has the possibility 
to zap him- or herself if he or she is tempted to pursue a behaviour that he or she 
would like to alter. With this action, Pavlok is supposed to arouse our inner voice, 
which will say to us: ‘Wake up sleepy head… it’s time to go to the gym!’, ‘Put down 
those chips!’, or ‘Stop wasting time on Facebook!’. The makers of Pavlok claim that 
this device helps unlock people’s true potential, making them accountable for their 
behaviour and better able to change it when needed. This device relies on the idea that 
with the help of conditioning exercises similar to the famous experiment Ivan Pavlov 
performed on a dog at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, one can alter people’s 
behaviour. Pavlok wearers testify that they were able to change their bad habits of 
overeating, nail baiting, hair pulling, and oversleeping because they started 
associating the feeling of being zapped with a prohibition on engaging in the bad 
habit. 
 
Pavlok seems to be an ideal accessory in an era when external prohibitions linked to 
traditional authorities are on the decline, and when people are increasingly imposing 
prohibitions on themselves. The idea that people need to constantly work on 
themselves and engage in various forms of self-improvement is the basis of the 
majority of apps and wearable devices. The invention boom related to these devices 
has raised the question of whether one truly needs to control and measure so many 
things in one’s life and what people gain with this multitude of apps.  
 
Kerastase, a producer of hair care products, is, for example, planning a new hairbrush, 
designed together with the tech company Withings. This “smart” hairbrush is 
supposed to assess how people treat their hair. With the help of a built-in microphone, 
the brush will listen to how people style their hair and then try to determine how 
frizzy or dry their hair is and even whether they have split ends. (Weatherford, 2017)
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Another example is Apple, who together with Nike created the Apple Watch Nike+, 
which comes in two sizes and features built-in GPS tracking, a perforated sports band 
for ventilation, Nike+ Run Club app integration, and exclusive Siri commands to start 
a run. On top of that, the watch is equipped with push notifications that are supposed 
to make us more prone to exercise. The Nike+ Run Club app entices wearers to run by 
offering daily motivations through smart run reminders. “Are we running today?”, for 
example, appears on the watch at the time when the person usually goes for a run. The 
app also sends challenges from friends and even alerts runners about the weather 
outside. It is not just that training data, including pace, distance, and heart rate are 
available at a glance, one also shares run summaries with one’s friends, which is 
supposed to promote friendly competition. The app even allows users to send fist 
bumps to each other right from the wrist as a form of encouragement. 
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 The explanation is that the brush works in such a way that “three-axis load cells measure the pressure 
you exert on your hair and scalp as you brush, and sensors count the number and speed of brush 
strokes, and gauge if hair is being brushed wet or dry.” (Weatherford, 2017) 
Constant nagging, comparison with others, and even punishment are tactics that new 
technologies are adapting in their attempt to make people follow their life-improving 
plans. For some, these apps might be of help when they try to change their habits, but 
one should not forget that the whole ideology behind self-improvement, which is 
linked to ideas concerning choice and success, contributes to feelings of inadequacy, 
anxiety, and guilt. Paradoxically, these feelings are an important underside of the 
post-industrial ideology of choice, which stresses the power of individual rational 
choice and to a much lesser degree issues that are a part of social choices where the 
state and other power players are in charge. (Salecl, 2011) 
 
One way we deal with these unpleasant feelings is by taking the device not as a 
surrogate super-ego voice that is supposed to replace our internal super-ego injunction 
that makes us feel guilty, but rather as an object that somehow does the job instead of 
us. Austrian philosopher Robert Pfaller coined the term interpassivity in order to 
describe people’s strategy when a device takes on the role of an intermediary that 
performs certain acts instead of the person. (Pfaller, 2009) An example is a person 
who constantly records movies, but never watches them. By recording the films, it is 
as if the person is allowed to do other things while the recorder “watches” the movie 
for him or her.2 Similarly, when a person makes a photocopy of a book that he or she 
never reads, it is as if the photocopier enjoys the book instead of the person.  
 
One can take tracking devices as these kinds of objects that are doing the job for us. 
When I download a daily planner or a fitness app I can easily continue to not do the 
task I planned, since the app is a stand-in to which I somehow delegate the enjoyment 
of doing it for me. The very act of downloading is already an act of work, even a 
moment of sacrifice (if I had to pay money for it). After I have completed this task 
(and sometimes it does not go easy), I can for a short while play with it, but soon the 
very fact that I have downloaded it will be enough – I can go on doing whatever I am 
doing, while the app is supposed to do the work for me.  
 
Let us take the example of a meditation app. I download it, maybe pay for it, do some 
meditations that it guides me to do, but in a few days I forget about it. Since I have it 
on my device, the app becomes a stand-in for my meditation practice. Invoking the 
term interpassivity, it can be said that the app is doing meditation for me, while I can 
go on doing my other things.  
 
If I can easily forget the app that I have downloaded and if the very fact that I have 
downloaded it seems to be already enough for me to feel content with myself, the 
problem is that the app does not forget about me. 
 
Ignorance and big data 
 
While most of the discussions about wearable technologies focus on the question of 
whether they work or not in changing people’s behaviour and how it is that people so 
easily ignore these devices, another form of ignorance – the one that pertains to the 
data that these devices collect about people – has been under far less scrutiny. 
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 Pfaller expanded his theory to works of art. In exhibitions of contemporary art it often happens that 
the visitor does not have an idea what the works of art he or she is observing are all about. When 
walking around the exhibition, the person, however, can have the impression that the curator somehow 
viewed the exhibition for them. (Pfaller, 2009) 
 Amy Pittman recalls a time when she was trying to get pregnant and became 
enthusiastic about a period tracker. As she points out:  
“Like many 20-somethings, I have an app for just about every important thing in my 
life. I have a health tracker that I ignore, a budget tracker that I ignore, an app to pay 
my bills that I try to ignore, and a period tracker that I’m obsessed with. Every week, 
I religiously tracked my mood on the period tracker along with my core temperature, 
the viscosity of various fluids, how often my husband and I were having sex, if sperm 
was present, etc. The app had more intimate knowledge of my reproductive behavior 
than my husband or any doctor. On the day of my positive pregnancy test, I logged 
into my period tracker to share the good news. When I did, it suggested a pregnancy 
app, which I downloaded immediately. It was full of bright colors and interactive 
graphics.”(Pittman, 2016)  
Sadly, Pittman soon miscarried. At that moment, she deactivated her pregnancy-
monitoring app. But logging off from the app did not prevent various marketing 
companies that target expecting women from continuing to send her info on 
pregnancy and baby products. The maker of her pregnancy app sold her info to 
marketing companies, however, when Pittman logged a miscarriage into the app and 
stopped using it, that information was not passed along. Pittman describes her shock 
when: 
“Seven months after my miscarriage, mere weeks before my due date, I came home 
from work to find a package on my welcome mat. It was a box of baby formula 
bearing the note: “We may all do it differently, but the joy of parenthood is something 
we all share.” (Pittman, 2016) 
A whole new surveillance domain has opened up with the help of big data that allows 
commercial companies, as well as the state, to monitor people’s daily lives. It is 
possible to ascertain that at the start of this massive collection of data people did not 
have an understanding of the market related to data collected about them. With 
various media addressing the problem of surveillance, however, it has become clear 
that it is not so much a lack of knowledge that is at work in the way people deal with 
their personal data, but rather a problem of ignorance. 
The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan made a puzzling statement when he said 
that people do not have a passion for knowledge, but rather a passion for ignorance. 
Lacan observed that although his patients come to analysis with the desire to learn 
about what is guiding them in their unconscious, in the process of analysis they will 
go to great lengths to not come close to some traumatic knowledge. (Lacan, 2007) 
Sigmund Freud, in his own time, also established the importance of not knowing. He 
looked at the strategies of negation that people adopt when they deal with something 
traumatic. One of Freud’s patients during his analysis described a dream and all of a 
sudden uttered: “The woman in my dream is not my mother.” (Freud, 2001) What 
was surprising about this sentence was that Freud had not implied that the woman in 
the man’s dream could be the patient’s mother. The negation was coming from the 
patient, and with this negation the patient was naming something and saying that 
something is not true.  
Freud’s explanation is that we are dealing here with a repressed idea, which emerges 
into consciousness by way of being denied. Negation becomes a way of making 
cognizant what is repressed in such a way that it labels the repressed idea. Through 
negation we therefore in some way reveal traumatic truth, i.e. negation is the first sign 
of recognising that truth, but not yet accepting it, which is why we resort to denial.  
For Freud, denial becomes both a testimony to the uncompleted task of recovering 
content from the repressed and some kind of a substitute for repression. It is, however, 
important to distinguish between denial and a lie. While a conscious lie would be an 
act to deceive, denial would rather be an act of impotence. (Ver Eecke, 2006: 34) 
When we deny something we inadvertently reveal what we wanted to hide. That is 
why denial also entails the opening up of a crack or fault, where a thought we were 
previously not conscious of suddenly emerges, which is why Freud, paradoxically, 
linked negation to the idea of freedom. He pointed out that when we have this crack, 
when through denial something emerges that is linked to traumatic truth, there is a 
possibility that the subject will start working through what had been repressed. It is, 
however, also possible that the subject will resort to new forms of repression.  
How is big data related to denial? When we connect ourselves to all kind of apps and 
tracking devices, often the last thing on our mind is what will happen to the data such 
devices record. Often, it is as if one does not perceive data to be related to oneself or 
even that one does not think there is data collected and passed on in the first place. 
We thus simply ignore that information about ourselves is collected, and that this 
information might be sold and in various ways used for surveillance and marketing 
purposes. 
Denial, however, becomes more complicated if we look at the content of the 
knowledge people often do not want to engage with. Studies in the field of denial 
have observed particular ways in which people deal with traumatic information in the 
domain of medicine. (Dorpat, 1987) Shlomo Breznitz observed seven different kinds 
of denial among his patients. (Breznitz, 1983) They often went from one type of 
denial to another; however, when a situation gets worse people often tend to regress to 
a more “primitive form of denial.”  
The first type of denial involves the negation of personal relevance. An example here 
is a study where a group of coronary patients witnessed a fatal cardiac arrest when 
they were in hospital. These patients, however, did not think that something like that 
could happen to them, too. The second is the denial of urgency. There is the example 
of people who in the past experienced a health emergency (a heart attack or cancer) 
and then delay calling for help when they experience a reoccurrence of the health 
problem. The third involves the denial of one’s vulnerability. Here, the cases involve 
people who feel that because they changed their lifestyle (they exercise, eat well, etc.) 
they are somehow protected from having another health crisis (for example, a heart 
attack). Another form of denial of one’s vulnerability involves people who completely 
give up their responsibility and perceive a heart attack as simply a matter of luck, fate, 
or other such uncontrollable factors. The fourth type of denial involves denial of the 
effects related to the traumatic experience that they went through. People who 
experience a heart attack might, for example, completely deny the anxiety related to 
this near death experience. The fifth type of denial involves people who experience 
certain affects and emotions in a life-threatening situation, however, they attribute 
them to other causes and not to the illness they are dealing with. Anxiety related to 
some rather insignificant issue can become a substitute for the life-threatening 
situation. The sixth form of denial involves the denial of information. A person might 
thus on a conscious level block any relevant information with regard to their illness 
and even disregard the advice they have been given by their doctors – i.e. coronary 
patients might stop exercising, not follow their prescribed diet, etc. On the 
unconscious level, however, they might very well have registered the information 
while they consciously deny it. The seventh form of denial pertains to severely 
depressed patients and to cases of psychosis where there might be indiscriminate 
denial of all information and the patient just seems to be in his or her own world, 
where the information regarding his or her health is simply not taken in. People might 
form delusions about their health that enable them to hold it together, however, their 
doctors’ information about the illness is completely rejected.  
 
With regard to big data and Internet security related to all kinds of information about 
us that is collected, we can observe a similar list of denials. Some people might have 
witnessed or read about cases of personal data being mishandled, but they do not 
think that something like that can happened to them. Others might not be bothered at 
all that their data is passed to corporations or the state. Still others might be anxious 
that someone might be listening in to their phone conversations, but are not bothered 
that data about their life are recorded by a fitness tracker. A person might also have 
the delusion that there is a camera recording his or her daily activities, while he or she 
does not take in the problem that his or her data are being collected by mobile phone 
apps. 
 
Nancy Tuana (Tuana, 2006) created a taxonomy of ignorance wherein she 
distinguishes four different ways we engage with the problem of not knowing: 
1. knowing that we do not know, yet do not care to know; 
2. not even knowing that we do not know; 
3. not knowing because (privileged) others do not want us to know; 
4. wilful ignorance. 
 
If we apply this taxonomy to big data, we can observe all four ways of not knowing at 
work in the way people engage therewith. We might not know what the data collected 
about us is used for and not care about it. We might not know that we do not know 
what happens with the data. It is possible that companies that collect the data do not 
want us to know. And it is also possible that we resort to wilful ignorance, i.e. in this 
case, we know that data is collected, that it is sold, and that it can be abused, but we 
simply resort to not caring about it. 
 
Another explanation of ignorance with regard to big data is that people are concerned 
that data is collected for potentially powerful uses that are not fully understood. 
(Andrejevic, 2014: 1682) Here, ignorance does not so much pertain to the fact that 
data is collected, but to dealing with the question of how it is used. A person might 
thus be aware of the collection of his or her data, however, the word of corporations 
who traffic in this data, the mechanisms of data mining, and the working of 
algorithms is something so alien and opaque that he or she cannot envision what such 
data can be used for or how it can be manipulated.  
 
Jacques Lacan pointed out that ignorance is not misrecognition. When we 
misrecognise something, there has already been a level of knowledge that has first 
been recognised and then in the next step misrecognised. (Lacan, 1988: 167/8) With 
regard to big data, misrecognition would be when we know that data is used in a 
manipulative way, but we misrecognise that as something beneficial. Ignorance, 
however, has to do with the fact that we close our eyes to knowledge that is too 
traumatic for us to bear. It might very well be that the opaque world in which data is 
used presents something so traumatic that we would rather close our eyes and do not 
want to come close to traumatic knowledge. Which is why we often so blindly 
consent to whatever Internet and app providers require us to do. 
 
Informed consent 
 
Whenever we download apps, sign up for free Internet in public spaces, register for 
loyalty cards, or put on wearable technology we are usually asked to tick a box that 
asks for our consent to the collection of data. Most often, we do this without reading 
the long document that in small print and in bureaucratic and legalistic language 
informs us of the rights of the service provider. We automatically click on the consent 
form and hope to start using the service without further interruptions. If we so easily 
ignore what we have given our consent to, one must question the purpose of engaging 
a customer in this game of consent.  
 
The contemporary idea of informed consent originates in medicine. (Murray, 1990) 
Its underlying presumption is that a person is a rational subject who can in an 
impartial way assess the information presented and then make a rational choice with 
regard to his or her well-being. The perception is also that a person who consents to a 
particular action has a clear understanding of the consequences and implications of 
such action.  
 
The idea of informed consent historically emerged as a result of various forms of 
abuse that happened in the domain of medicine. The most important were the medical 
experiments performed in Nazi Germany on prisoners in concentration camps. Cases 
where people were either deceived or coerced to take part in medical research or 
when people were not informed of the possible outcomes of certain medical 
procedures also contributed to the demand that consent become an important part of 
the interaction in the domain of medical practice and research. Struggles against 
paternalism in medicine, as well as appeals for respect for the autonomy of the patient 
have also contributed to the promulgation of the idea of informed consent. (Manson, 
2007) 
 
Medical ethicists discuss many dilemmas related to informed consent – from the 
question of what it means to be properly informed, to the capacity to make decisions, 
legal aspects of consent, to cases of the exclusion of consent (with regard to children, 
mentally disabled patients, etc.). Rarely, however, do discussions touch on the 
conscious and unconscious mechanisms that guide people in their decision-making 
and also in their refusal to make such decisions. What is equally neglected in 
discussions on informed consent is the embracement of ignorance on the side of the 
patient as well as on the side of the authority in charge of drafting the consent form 
(e.g. a medical institution).  
 For an informed consent to become a viable legally-enforceable contractual 
document, it needs to encompass a certain perception of the subject as a rational 
person capable of making decisions that contribute to his or her well being. Both the 
illusion of rationality as well as the illusion of the utilitarian tendencies of people 
underpinning the idea of informed consent. Dilemmas related to the unconscious 
mechanisms that guide people, as well as the fact that people often do not follow 
utilitarian ideas about maximising pleasure and minimising pain had to be refuted. 
 
This illusion of rationality is a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of the 
contractual relationship between the patient and the doctor (as well as the medical 
institution). In our highly litigious times, informed consent, however, has opened the 
doors to new forms of ignorance on the side of the patient. When we undertake the 
most insignificant medical procedure, we need to sign a document where we agree to 
all kinds of possibly damaging outcomes of these procedures. One usually quickly 
glances over the text and signs the form without actually fully rationally digesting the 
information presented. Here we embrace various forms of denial, which are not so 
different from the above-mentioned denials. 
 
We might engage in wishful thinking that all the disasters that can happen during the 
procedure will not happen to us. We might also deny the effects that the information 
on such disasters provokes in us. Or we might deny that there is a rational logic 
presented in the document as such. Since we know that informed consent forms are 
cut and paste documents that are used for various situations, we might perceive them 
as merely legal gibberish that acts as a protective shield for the medical establishment. 
 
Without this ignorance, it is quite possible to envision that a person who took 
seriously the warning as to what might go wrong as presented in the informed consent 
document would not choose to undergo the procedure or might become extremely 
anxious or even paranoid.  
 
A similar situation is at work in our dealings with the Internet. If we were to read all 
the various informed consent documents that we blindly agree to, it is quite possible 
that we would not install the majority of apps on our phones, put on wearable 
technology, or connect to open Internet servers.  
 
The problem with informed consent is that it primarily protects the provider of a 
service, while for the consumer it more and more presents a case of a forced choice. 
We are offered a choice to either consent to giving away our data or not. However, if 
we say no, we lose the very possibility to enjoy the device that collects the data. 
Similarly, if we do not consent to allow ourselves to be monitored by Internet 
providers we are denied connection to the Internet in the first place. In cases of forced 
choice, one is in principle offered a choice, however, this choice involves only one 
option. In a way, choice is offered and denied at the same time.  
 
An example of forced choice existed in socialist Yugoslavia when young men were 
obliged to serve in the army. When young men became conscripts, they had to go 
through a ritual where they took an oath saying that they freely chose to become a 
member of the Yugoslav army. However, one man took this choice seriously and said 
that since becoming a member of the army was a matter of choice, he chose not to 
join it. When this happened, he was immediately sent to prison. The choice in 
question was offered and denied at the same time.  
 
Lacan explained the idea of forced choice by envisioning a situation wherein a man is 
confronted by a robber who demands: “Your money or your life!” This demand puts 
the man in a position of forced choice. If he chooses his money, he will lose his life 
and thus will not be able to enjoy the wealth that he saved. The only choice that is left 
to him is his life, which, however, will be less enjoyable since he will lack money. 
(Feldstein, Fink, and Jaanus, 1995: 47) 
 
Similarly, when we are asked to consent to the use of devices that track our data, we 
are offered a choice: enjoy our app, but give us consent to do with your data what we 
will or you can have your life without the app. The choice is thus between life without 
data or digital death. 
 
Machines cannot be wrong 
 
While we blindly consent to giving our data away, we often also blindly place our 
trust in the machines that handle such data. Belief in the power of computers is such 
that we often do not even envision that serious mistakes can be made in the way they 
work.  
 
A few years ago, I presided over a panel that evaluated the output of research groups. 
I was not linked to these research groups and the evaluators were from abroad. This 
setting was supposed to allow for an objective account of the researcher’s work, 
which, of course, had serious implications for their future funding. My job was fairly 
simple. On top of facilitating the evaluators’ reports, I had to put their marks into an 
Excel spreadsheet, which in the end would automatically calculate the results, 
providing me with a list of winners and losers. I meticulously recorded the marks into 
Excel so that potential errors might not affect the results. In the end, I got the results 
and the evaluation was done. A few hours later, I looked at the form again and had the 
feeling that something was amiss. Groups that consistently got good marks from the 
evaluators were not as high on the list of results as I had expected. I rechecked 
whether I had put all the marks into the form correctly and it all looked fine. I clicked 
the calculation button again and got the same results as before. Frustrated, I decided 
to do the calculation by hand. To my surprise, the results turned out different. I denied 
the possibility that the computer might be wrong and decided to do the calculations 
one more time. Finally, I had to acknowledge that the spreadsheet had not been 
formulated properly. When I contacted the agency that had set up the Excel 
spreadsheet at first no one believed me that the machine had produced the wrong 
calculation. Finally, the IT personnel confirmed that there was an error in the 
algorithm which, as a result of my complaint, they were able to solve. Until I had that 
experience, I was a very trusting user of similar forms. Subsequently, I started 
wondering how many similar calculation mistakes are at work in our computer-
dependent work and why we do not pay more attention to them. 
 
In the world of big data, we must not only deal with potential computer failures, but 
also a high level of opacity related to how this data is collected, how it is interpreted, 
who has access to it, and how it can be manipulated. We also deal with sample bias, 
as well as an increased desire to see in data what we want to see in the first place. In 
addition, the way companies use algorithms to comb through data is usually secret.  
 
It is thus not surprising that big data is opening new avenues of blindness. 
Paradoxically, when we collect a great amount of data, suddenly people start seeing 
patterns in random data. Researchers of big data thus point out that we are 
experiencing apophenia: seeing patterns where none actually exist, simply because 
enormous quantities of data can offer connections that radiate in all directions. 
(Dugain and Labbe, 2016) 
 
One of the ways we often deal with blind spots is by trying to visualise them. ‘Gaps’, 
cracks in knowledge, are in a particular way linked to the fantasies we create around 
them. Art provides one way to look at these gaps. Contemporary art has been 
fascinated with the new developments in science. We can thus find numerous artists 
who use brain images, genetic code, and knowledge from the fields of astrophysics 
and physics in general in their art. Not surprisingly, big data has also found its place 
in the domain of art. The Norwegian artist Toril Johannessen, for example, in her art 
project “Words and Years” uses big data to create pictures that try to alert viewers to 
important themes in today’s world. Combing through data in scientific journals, she 
created a picture that shows when and with what frequency the word crisis is used 
with regard to nature or society, how often the word miracle is used with regard to 
nature and society, and how many articles in the field of genetics deal with the words 
greed and desire.
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Even before the rapid development of statistics, artists collected data and used them in 
art works. In the 1980s, the Russian artists Vitaliy Komar and Alex Melamid, for 
example, conducted surveys in different countries asking people what a beautiful 
painting looks like and what an ugly one looks like. Following the results of the 
survey, they then produced an ideally beautiful painting and an ugly one. Quite 
universally, the result of the surveys was that people perceived as beautiful paintings 
those that showed scenes of nature with mountains, with a sunny sky, and an animal 
in the setting, while they perceived as ugly paintings that consisted of abstract 
triangles in dark, unappealing colours. Both the most beautiful and the most ugly 
paining used the mean results of the artists’ surveys. (Dissanayake, 1998) Observing 
the beautiful and ugly painting that they then painted incited in the viewer an uncanny 
feeling  – trying to comply with people’s idea of what beautiful or ugly painting looks 
like took away the edge of surprise that often accompanies good art work. By taking 
seriously what people perceived as beautiful and what as ugly art, the artists tried to 
put into words and realize in an image what usually cannot be grasped in a rational 
way. What makes an art work great usually escapes words, which is why it is not easy 
to rationally describe what makes one art work beautiful and another ugly. 
 
In order to depict the nature of what cannot easily be put into words and what escapes 
people’s rational perceptions of themselves as well as the world around them, Jacques 
Lacan used the term “the real”. This term does not pertain to what we usually 
understand as reality, but rather to what escapes the perception of reality that we form 
with the help of language as well as images.  
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 In today’s times we have various attempts to come close to this real with the help of 
science and new technology. Genetics and neuroscience, for example, give us the 
perception that decoding the genome and perfecting brain scans might help us 
comprehend what makes us human. Big data, in its own way, tries to closely approach 
the secret of subjectivity. These attempts, open up the space for new fantasies to be 
formed around the ungraspable in subjectivity. Dominique Cardon points out that we 
need to ask what algorithms dream about and how they operate on human desires. 
Although we are often under the impression that with the help of algorithms we can 
escape the “tyranny of the centre” and enable the diversification of society, which as a 
result will hopefully be less hierarchical, in reality the opposite is true and algorithms 
allow for the perpetuation of inequalities. And we should not forget that the devices 
that provide data are also becoming objects with the help of which new forms of 
hacking attacks can easily become carried out. 
 
One of the most surprising cyber attacks happened in the US in 2016 when a large 
number of security cameras and other domestic devices were infected with a fairly 
simple program that guessed their factory-set passwords – often “admin” or “12345” 
or even “password”. Once these devices were infected, they were turned into an army 
of simple robots, which at a coordinated time were then instructed to bombard a small 
company in Manchester, N.H., with messages. This attack overloaded the circuits of 
the company. This company functioned as one of the Internet’s giant switchboards, so 
as a result of its failure numerous US companies such as Twitter, Reddit, Airbnb, and 
even The New York Times lost their Internet connection or it slowed to a crawl. 
(Sanger and Perlroth, 2016) 
While many experienced this Internet attack as a fleeting inconvenience, it portends 
much more. In the era of the Internet of Things, the problem is not only that such 
hacks happen in interconnected refrigerators and security cameras, but that they are 
also happening to a growing number medical instruments and recreational devices — 
such as heartbeat-monitoring watches — that report medically-relevant information. 
Cyber-security for these devices is increasingly becoming a big problem, since state 
regulations that pertain to financial data often do not pertain to health care records. 
(Haun and Topol, 2017) Taking into account the fact that these devices are portable, 
one encounters problems related to their security that go beyond state jurisdictions. 
Which is why some cyber security experts are calling for industry-wide cooperation 
in the adoption of security standards before some major hack occurs, while others are 
trying to teach people how to protect themselves from having their devices hacked 
and their private data appropriated by new types of cyber criminals. 
Conclusion 
 
We often glorify the pursuit of knowledge; however, the desire to not know is equally 
important for our survival. Closing our eyes, not seeing something that is traumatic, 
or not remembering what has been painful and hard to deal with are strategies that 
people have embraced with a passion equal to that with which they have embraced the 
pursuit of new knowledge. 
 
In order to understand the nature of such ignorance, we can say that it in some way 
allows a person to not come close to what is traumatic. In our private lives, repression 
helps us push away what is for us consciously hard to comprehend. But with 
ignorance, it is as if we have all the information but it does not pertain to us. An 
individual, for example, can have information about a threat, but behave as if it does 
not concern him. This kind of ignorance paradoxically contributes to a feeling of 
omnipotence; we perceive ourselves as being more powerful than we actually are. 
Such feelings of omnipotence can contribute to belief in the idea of technological 
development and progress that does not allow for seeing the negative consequences 
thereof.  
 
If we compare ignorance of the use of big data with the denial that can be observed 
with regard to climate change, we can see a similarity at work in the way these two 
forms of closing our eyes deal with the idea of progress. People in the developed 
world are afraid to admit that the belief in development that underlies modern 
capitalism is in fact something that cannot last forever. People are also afraid to face 
the prospect that climate change might actually lead to a decline in economic growth, 
and that any government intervention in the market through various mechanisms of 
controlling carbon dioxide emissions and introducing penalties for corporations might 
also imply loss of the idea of freedom, which for many people is related to the idea of 
the free market. Even those who are aware of the warnings that scientists are issuing 
as to climate change often have various strategies enabling them to believe that these 
warnings do not affect them per se. People often deny both that climate change means 
that they themselves need to do something and that society needs to change its course 
as regards what it perceives as development.  
 
This denial is often related to the fact that a lot of people are afraid of change and that 
they are anxious about what potential changes might mean as regards their future. 
People might also be afraid that the future will not involve the idea of progress, which 
they hope will continue. Clive Hamilton warns that the climate change bill will be 
received by the next generation, since it will entail a bill issued for the incredibly 
rapid development of the past, which is based mainly on energy that we obtain from 
fossil fuels. (Hamilton, 2015) Prosperity is important for the current generation, 
something that allows this generation to live longer, healthier lives in the developed 
world. The problem of this generation, however, is that it has not paid the full price of 
this progress. The rest of the price will be charged to future generations.  
 
With regard to big data, we also have an over optimistic idea of how this data 
contributes to progress. Here, too, the price for this belief will be paid by future 
generations. On top of problems involving the mismanagement of data, bombardment 
by consumerism, and new forms of surveillance, future generations will need to deal 
with the fact that it never consented to its data being collected from the moment of 
conception. Which is why researchers dealing with the problems of big data warn that 
our ideas of privacy and informed consent do not encompass the fact that data on 
children are nowadays being collected on a massive scale without them being able to 
control or comprehend the impact this will have on their future lives. (Lupton and 
Williamson, 2017) 
 
Optimistic big data researchers like to point out that big data need not be regarded 
simply from a negative perspective, i.e. people can be empowered to use data to their 
advantage and that data that is available through open access can significantly 
contribute to scientific research and social change.  
Proponents of big data thus like to point out that an individual should have access to 
his or her data so that he or she can make full use of it. The idea is that a person’s 
tracking devices and computer know more about his or her habits than he or she 
consciously does. Knowing about the data that is collected about oneself will help one 
better navigate life. Mark Andrejevic warns against such enthusiasm by pointing out 
that there exists a great discrepancy in power between those who collect big data and 
those who are the objects of such collection: “Even if users had access to their own 
data, they would not have the pattern recognition or predictive capabilities of those 
who can mine aggregated databases. Moreover, even if individuals were provided 
with everyone else’s data (a purely hypothetical conditional), they would lack the 
storage capacity and processing power to make sense of the data and put it to use.” 
(Andrejevic, 2014: 1674) One can add to this the observation that psychoanalysis, 
already at the time of Freud, observed that, sadly, people might rationally state that 
they are concerned about their well-being while unconsciously they do everything that 
goes against this idea. They thus often do not follow their rationally proclaimed goals, 
but rather continue on the path of pain, guilt, and even self-punishment.  
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